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ABSTRACT
African affairs occupied a secondary status in Turkish foreign policy until
very recently. However, following the adoption of the Action Plan for Opening
up to Africa in the late 1990s, Turkish politicians started to assign a higher
priority to relations with African countries. The incumbent Turkish government
now attaches great importance to developing long-term relations with those
countries. We can also see that Africa’s image in Turkey is changing with
journalists presenting new narratives about the continent and supporting
Turkish involvement in African affairs. There is also an increasing interest in
African studies in the academia, although scholarly work produced on African
issues remains limited. This study explores the evolution of Turkish-African
relations and concentrates mostly on Turkey’s economic engagement in African
countries. It also seeks to analyse recent Turkish initiatives in Africa’s energy
sector. The article argues, among other things, that although the low level of
attention paid to African issues has changed, the pace of the development of
relations with Africa is still slow and more steps have to be taken to further
improve relations with African countries.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
For many years, Turkish foreign policy gave very low priority to
engagement with African countries. Instead, following the establishment
of the Turkish Republic in 1923, successive Turkish governments focused
on developing political, economic and military relations with the
Western world and neighbouring regions. Nearly all African countries
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Ortadogu Politikasi in Türk Dis Politikasinin Analizi (ed.) Faruk Sönmezoglu,
Istanbul: Der Yayinlari (2001) 130-131; N Hazar (2003). Küresellesme Sürecinde
Afrika ve Türkiye-Afrika Iliskileri. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayinlari 112-113.
3 For example, in the official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is noted
that the Ottoman Empire prevented colonial expansion in Northern and Eastern
Africa (See Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey-Africa Relations. http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa. (30.09.2014). One can also see
a higher level of attention being paid to the importance of Africa in the public
statements of various senior politicians, including the current President and
former Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Speaking at the 8th African
were under colonial rule then; hence they did not register in Turkish
foreign policy priorities. Even during the early years of decolonization,
Turkey still could not develop relations with those countries. The Cold
War dynamics compelled the Turkish government to align itself with
the West, thereby emphasizing Turkey’s role in the US-led Western
bloc. During this period, alliance with Western countries was
considered one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. Indeed,
Turkey paid such special attention to its relations with Western countries
that its attitude at the historic Asian-African Conference of 1955 – also
known as the Bandung Conference – caused the Turkish government to
be defined as “the spokesman of American imperialism”.1 For example,
Turkey’s representative at the meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin
Rüstü Zorlu, warned Asian-African leaders against the “dangers of non-
alignment” and emphasized the benefits of aligning with the Western
world. Turkey also sided with its NATO allies during the Suez Crisis,
joined the Baghdad Pact (seen by Arab and Northern African states as
a vehicle of US expansionism in the Middle East) and abstained from
voting for Algerian independence in the United Nations (UN).2
On the other hand, Turkey, historically, has had close relations with
the North African countries dating back to the Ottoman Empire, which
had a presence in most of North Africa, as well as some parts of the
Horn of Africa (especially Ethiopia and Somalia). Having been under
the Ottoman rule for centuries, the North African countries shared a
common history, religion, and traditions with the Ottoman Empire
and its successor, the Turkish Republic. One can easily see the impact
of this legacy, along with an emphasis on the Ottoman Empire’s non-
colonial record, on the continent.3 However, Turkey only began to engage
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sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries by starting diplomatic relations
with many of them in the late 1960s and 1970s. For example, it
provided foreign aid to a few African countries, such as Namibia,
Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea; signed mutual trade and cooperation
agreements, such as the Economic and Technical Cooperation
Agreements with Sierra Leone and Somalia; and carried out official
visits to some African countries, including Ethiopia, Tunisia and Egypt
during the 1970s and early 1980s.4  However, the independence
struggles of those countries, together with Turkey’s lack of financial
resources and political disinterest impeded further development of
relations with African countries during this period.
This active foreign policy attitude of the 1970s continued during
the 1980s and early 1990s under the leadership of Turgut Özal, who
sought to liberalize the Turkish economy. During this period, Turkey
approached the Middle Eastern countries, as well as the newly
independent states in Central Asia, South Caucasia, and the Balkans,
seeking to develop collaboration with them. It was also during this
period that Turkey’s membership was rejected by the European Union
in 1989. However, Turkey’s aspiration to create a Turkish community
and become its leader was not embraced by the newly independent
Union Summit held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, Erdoðan declared that
“Africa is the centre of our common future. The success of Africa will be a success
for all humanity” (Hürriyet, 29.01.2007). This is even as the former President,
Abdullah Gül, has argued that the Turkish government, which had always
demonstrated “an unrequited love” for Africa, should adopt a different foreign
policy approach to the region than that taken by the European powers. This
policy is based on equal partnership and includes investing in, bringing new
technology into and introducing better qualified manpower to African countries,
rather than simply pursuing Turkish interests (cited in Afacan, 2012: 17; Arman,
25.03.2011). Following the First Ministerial Review Conference of Turkey-Africa
Cooperation held in Ýstanbul in December 2011, the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and previous Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, also predicted that the
21st century will be Africa’s century and that, as an African himself, he was
“proud of Africa’s rise” (Turkish NY, 16.12.2011). Such an emphasis on win-win
relationships, mutual interests and cooperation can be observed in nearly every
public speech of Turkish officials about Africa.
4 V. Ipek & G Biltekin “Turkey’s foreign policy implementation in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A post-internationalist approach” (2013) New Perspectives on Turkey. 49:
126-127; B Oran, Az Geliþmiþ Ülke Milliyetçiliði: Kara Afrika Modeli (Ankara:
Bilgi Yayinevi (1977), 677.
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of economic measures taken to help improve relations with African countries. As
Özkan notes, diversifying economic relations was one of the major motivations
for Turkey’s recent involvement in Africa, so economic measures have a central
place in the Opening Up policy. These include signing economic, technical and
scientific cooperation agreements with African countries, inviting the ministers
responsible for the economy, commerce, industry, agriculture, education and
health and African experts on technical education programmes. Other measures
included coordinating technical assistance programmes for African countries,
becoming a non-regional member of the African Development Bank and the
African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), promoting mutual investment and
business visits, and establishing business councils or joint chambers of commerce,
Özkan, supra note 34,  Hazar, 2012: 8).
7 M. Þahin, Anadolu Kaplanlari Türkiye’yi Ortadogu ve Afrika’da Etkili Kiliyor.
(2011) Ortadogu Analiz 2(17): 95-99.
8 Here, it should be noted that this “conservative bourgeoisie” emerged in the
1980s and created its own business associations in order to explore new market
opportunities provided by an important segment of the incumbent AKP’s (Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi) electoral support base (Atli, 2011: 124).
Central Asian countries.5 Having lost its strategic importance to the
Western world after the Cold War and being denied membership of the
European Union (EU), following the EU’s decision at the 1997
Luxembourg Summit, the Turkish government decided to pursue a
multidimensional foreign policy rather than solely aligning itself with
the West. In its search for foreign policy alternatives by playing a more
dynamic and constructive role in world politics in the post-Cold War
period, Turkey adopted its Opening to Africa Policy in 1998 when Ýsmail
Cem was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.6 Similarly, a new bourgeoisie
that emerged during the liberalization of the 1980s began to push for
the opening up to new markets.7 This new class soon began to influence
foreign policy-making as economic issues gained greater significance
in foreign policy.8
The foreign policy activism of the 1980s continued throughout the
1990s when Turkey sought to diversify its foreign policy alternatives
and reach new markets. Given this background, the adoption of the
Opening to Africa policy constituted a major policy shift, which had
the wider aim of engaging with other regions than the West. Kirisçi
also notes that the lobbying of Turkish companies and business
associations played an important role in the development of the
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9 K Kirisçi,  “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading
State” (2009). New Perspectives on Turkey. 40: 29-57.
10 Hazar, 2012: 8.
11 Özkan, 2010: 534, n 34; Özkan and Akgün, 2010: 532, n 34.
12 The Strategy also stated various objectives to develop bilateral and multilateral
economic and trade relations with African countries. These include increasing
trade volume with African countries, encouraging direct investment by Turkish
companies – primarily small and medium-sized enterprises – in those countries,
gradually increasing the number of Turkish firms and banks operating in African
markets, signing preferential trade arrangements and free trade agreements
with African countries, and supporting African countries’ efforts to gain
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Kizilarsla, 2007: 25-26).
13 It is also true that the AKP government is looking for new partners outside the
Western world as it seeks to increase its role in world politics. On the other hand,
Turkish officials do not take the recent foreign policy activism as conflicting with
Turkey’s historical relations with the West. Rather, it complements its EU vision.
Davutoðlu further says that “the road to Paris passes through Africa” (Hürriyet
Daily News, 27.02.2009). This new foreign policy understanding is also visible
in Davutoðlu’s seminal book, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth, 2001). Before
becoming the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey, Davutoglu steered Turkish foreign
policy under the AKP rule by serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs between
2009 and 2014, and chief advisor on foreign affairs to then Prime Minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, from 2003. In Strategic Depth, Davutoglu proposes several
principles for Turkish foreign policy that require the implementation of a novel
vision-oriented, systematic and dynamic foreign policy with more active
involvement in international issues. According to Davutoglu, the strength of a
country can be measured by its economic, cultural and diplomatic activism in
other regions. Therefore, the Turkish government should revise its foreign policy
Opening Policy.9 This is no surprise as the Action Plan for Opening Up
to Africa was prepared following consultation not only with government
officials, but also Turkish ambassadors to African countries, African
ambassadors, and representatives of the private sector.10 However,
Turkey’s financial crisis, political instability and lack of political will
subsequent impeded the implementation of the plan until AKP’s
accession to power in 2002.11
Having both adequate financial resources and political will, the
AKP government continued to pursue a proactive foreign policy,
especially in the once-neglected regions. It is no surprise, therefore,
that the Strategy on the Development of the Economic Relations,12
prepared by the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade in 2003, followed
the Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa under the AKP government.
AKP has assumed a greater role in regional and world politics, with its
engagement with African countries being an important part of this
new foreign policy vision.13 To this end, the AKP government has used
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humanitarian aid and development assistance as a means to develop
its relations with African countries, which would, in turn, complement
Turkey’s commercial interests. In line with this approach, government
agencies, including TIKA (the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination
Agency) and AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority),
have increased their activities in Africa and provided humanitarian and
development support to many African countries. Several non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) also operate in African countries
and enhance Turkey’s visibility and prestige in the region. Business
groups, together with these NGOs, have also helped to implement the
Opening Up plan to Africa.
These factors explain why Turkey’s initiatives in Africa differ from
the involvement of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
or even European powers. Unlike the latter, Turkey does not have a
colonial past in the continent, nor has it the negativities seen in other
countries’ relations with African countries. The fact that Turkey gained
its independence from some of these same powers is also a source of
sympathy among African people (Habiyaremye and Oguzlu, 2014: 79).
An important part of Turkey’s engagement in Africa is the contribution
of non-state actors, which has helped to enhance Turkey’s presence
through their humanitarian activities and trade relations. It is argued
that among these organizations, Gülen-inspired humanitarian associa-
tions, schools and business groups have once become a source of Turkish
soft power in the region. The Gülen movement is especially active in
education, opening schools in sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1990s
(Harte, 2012). However, Gülen-affiliated schools are now defined as
agents of a parallel state and the government aims to replace these
schools with government-sponsored schools providing the same service.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also called on African leaders to shut
down the schools. Özkan notes that “these developments could possibly
contribute to closer cooperation between Ankara and African capitals
since the Turkish authorities are increasingly likely to develop a more
direct and comprehensive policy toward the continent. In this sense,
by focusing on other distant regions, and not only its immediate neighborhood.
In line with his brief criticisms of previous government policies that ignored
Africa, he noted that Turkey has to reconsider its African policy in the post-Cold
War era because continued deprioritization of Africa would be an unacceptable
mistake and weakness in Turkish foreign policy in this new period.
2017 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND AFRICA 7
14 2014: 27.
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various aspects of Turkish-African relations will continue to remain on
the forefront of public attention in the foreseeable future”.14
While the government is still the dominant actor in delivering
humanitarian assistance, the role of civil society organizations is
increasing. Both government institutions and Turkish NGOs provide
direct aid, working in high-risk areas in contrast to other traditional
powers that generally implement their aid activities via local NGOs
and/or international aid organizations. On the other hand, Western
countries use both multilateral channels and local/international NGOs
while BRICS generally operate bilaterally or through multilateral
organizations, with an emphasis on South-South cooperation. Because
Russia, for example, is hesitant to work with NGOs, it channels most
of its humanitarian aid through multilateral humanitarian agencies.15
Chinese NGOs also play only a marginal role in delivering Chinese
external assistance, and this is not likely to change in the near future.
Only a few Chinese NGOs are involved in aid projects and they are
generally seen as policy implementers of the Chinese government.16
India’s contributions to international organizations have increased,
especially in the last years. However, like the Chinese case, financial
constraints mean that only a few Indian NGOs are active abroad. India,
thus, prefers to use multilateral channels, especially in complex
humanitarian emergencies.17 The focus of Brazilian aid is technical
assistance, especially for health and agricultural projects, and the
transfer of technology from Brazilian institutions. South Africa’s
presence is mostly concentrated in Southern Africa, but its financial
capacity in development assistance and humanitarian aid is not
comparable to that of other BRICS countries. As with Turkey’s
involvement in Africa, the aid activities of those powers have facilitated
commercial expansion in the continent. However, BRICS aid is often bound
up with the purchase of goods and services from those countries.18
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Turkish aid, on the other hand, generally does not come with many
strings attached, in contrast with concessional aid or grants, such as
China’s “loans-for-oil” policy or India’s development assistance provided
in exchange for the purchase of Indian goods (Poon, 2013). Another
difference in Turkey’s African engagement is the increasing activities of
Turkish NGOs operating in various African countries. This multiplicity
of actors involved in foreign policy-making towards Africa is very visible
in the Turkish context. At the same time, Turkish aid, as for that of
other traditional and emerging powers in Africa, serves the country’s
economic interests. In other words, Turkey is also economically
motivated in its interest in Africa. However, while other emerging
powers, such as the BRICS, concentrate both on the import or control
of Africa’s natural resources and on developing market opportunities,
the Turkish government aspires to create markets for Turkish products
and find investment opportunities for its companies. During the colonial
period, European powers exploited Africa’s natural resources for their
own economic development. These former colonial powers still use
these trade relations with African countries inherited from the colonial
era. The USA, on the other hand, uses both diplomatic and military
involvement to secure access to Africa’s abundant resources.19
The US government established AFRICOM (The United States Africa
Command) in 2007,which is responsible for military relations and
security cooperation with African nations and regional organizations.20
However, it is argued that the Command also aims at reducing Chinese
influence in the continent as access to African resources is still an
important part of US national strategy. The Western hegemony over
Africa’s resource market have been challenged by the emerging powers,
and the traditional powers of the USA and the EU now feel threatened
by the increasing influence of these countries, especially China. China
combines its trade relations with investment in the infrastructure and
development capacities of African countries. It has thus changed the
structure of the competition over African resources. At the centre of
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22 Africa’s trade with Brazil (in goods) in 2015 amounted toUS$16.9 billion. Russia-
Africa trade was roughly more than US$10 billion while US-African trade was
US$51 billion. On the other hand, EU-Africa trade the same year exceeded
US$300 billion during. Africa’s major import category both from the USA and
the EU is machinery, nuclear equipment and boilers while Africa’s exports to the
USA and the EU are mostly mineral fuels and oils. See <http://
www.trademap.org/Index.aspx for more detailed info on Africa’s bilateral trade
data with those countries/regions>
23 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2013. Africa-BRICS
Cooperation: Implications for Growth, Employment and Structural
Transformation in Africa. Ethiopia, United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (2014). BRICS/Africa: Partnership for Development – Driving Inclusive
Growth and Transformational Change. Ethiopia. 21-22.
this East-West rivalry for Africa’s oil and minerals are oil contracts,
mining concessions and trade deals.21
In contrast with BRICS having large investments in African energy
industry, Turkey only has a few initiatives in Africa’s energy and mining
sectors. As will be discussed in more detail in the following parts of
the article, Turkish-African trade also still falls below the expected rates
atUS$17.5 billion in 2015. Meanwhile, Africa’s trade with the BRICS
has grown faster than its trade with other regions, being projected to
reach US$500 billion by 2015.China’s trade with African countries
(mostly on primary commodities) approached US$300 billion in
2015. African trade with India, another important trade partner, was
also projected to reach US$100 billion in 2015 (China Daily, 10
November 2015; The Economist, 17 January 2015; United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa, 2013).22
However, there is an increasing diversity in the BRICS’ sectoral
interests. China and India are the two main consumers of agricultural
raw material exports (more than 90 per cent) and fuel exports (almost
85 per cent) from Africa. On the other hand, the BRICS export mainly
manufactured goods (particularly China) and food products (particularly
Brazil) to Africa (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
2013). Having its own abundant natural resources, Russia invests
mainly in fuel energy and agriculture while Brazilian corporations also
focus on energy, natural resources and mining. India invests more in
manufacturing, energy and telecommunication; while South Africa also
invests in telecommunications and manufacturing. Chinese investments
are focused on various sectors, including agriculture, infrastructure,
energy and telecommunications.23 In 2012, China’s investment in Africa,
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25 For a full list of Turkish missions abroad, including Africa <http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-representations.en.mfa>
especially by Chinese state-owned enterprises, exceeded US$40 billion
while the total investments of Turkish companies reached only 6.2
billion dollars in early 2016.24
This article will proceed with a more detailed analysis of the
evolution of Turkey-Africa relations with a particular focus on the
involvement of non-state actors. Drawing on recent trade data, the
third part of the article, analyses Turkey’s economic engagement in
Africa along with recent initiatives in Africa’s energy sector. Finally, the
conclusion concentrates on the challenges and prospects awaiting
Turkish-African relations which might weaken relations with African
countries. It is argued that, although the revival in Turkey’s relations
with African countries is a positive development in diversifying Turkish
foreign policy, more steps have to be taken to further develop political
relations and increase trade volumes, which still remain below the
anticipated level.
2.  TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA
Various interrelated developments are responsible for Turkey’s recent
engagement in Africa, with the ruling AKP government now assigning
a higher priority to the region. The decision to open up to Africa through
government agencies and civic and business channels was a significant
rhetorical and policy shift. By attaching great importance to Africa for
the reasons discussed above, Turkey has not only strengthened bilateral
relations with the majority of African countries25 but also with non-
governmental actors, including civil society organizations and business
associations. The Turkish government has also shown serious interest
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in Africa as a whole. This has resulted in greater involvement in African
issues, including active participation in peacekeeping missions and
providing significant amounts of humanitarian assistance, an increased
diplomatic presence and the expansion of commercial relations. Turkey
has also enhanced relations with regional organizations, such as the
African Union, while Turkish embassies in various African countries
are now accredited to the following sub-regional organizations: IGAD
(Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum),
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), EAC (East
African Community), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa) and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central Asian
States).26 Non-state actors have also helped to enhance Turkey’s presence
in African countries. For example, TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of
Businessmen and Industrialists) has once been very active in organizing
business meetings and annual summits between African countries and
Turkey while MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s
Association) have organized other small-scale activities, including
business forums. Having a semi-legal status, DEIK (Foreign Economic
Relations Board) has established business councils in 30 African
countries. Turkish NGOshave also increased their humanitarian
activities, investing especially in education, health, and emergency relief.
In turn, this multifaceted interest of government and non-state
actors has driven academic interest, culminating in an increase in
scholarly work on Africa. As of 2016, three universities offer Masters
Programmes on African Studies, including Gazi University, Ankara
University, and Istanbul Ticaret University, with research centres being
established within universities and think-tanks outside the universities.
These efforts all aim at increasing awareness on African issues. Similarly,
seven universities now have African Studies Research Cen+tres which
are located at Kadir Has University, Ankara University, Izmir University
of Economics, Kirklareli University, Erciyes University, Istanbul AYdin
University and Gazi University. An important Turkish think-tank, the
Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies (TASAM), has an African
Institute, which publishes important work and organizes various
conferences, workshops, and roundtables on African issues. Apart from
TASAM, there is the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies,
operating under the name International Strategic Research Organization
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(USAK) while the International Relations and Strategic Analysis Centre
(TURKSAM) also studies the region within its Middle East and Africa
Centre. Such centres aim to contribute to the development of literature
on Africa by conducting scientific and policy research, and training
researchers willing to specialize on the continent.
In contrast with the former neglect of the continent, there is now a
strong emphasis by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on developing
long-term relations with African countries. Africa is redefined as “one
of the prime orientations of Turkish foreign policy”, and as a re-emerging
continent “with many promising developments”, such as increased
regional integration, good governance, democracy, conflict prevention
and economic development. To establish long-term relations with African
countries, the ministry aims at establishing closer political relations,
supporting the democratic, good governance and economic objectives
of African countries, especially through trade, investment and
humanitarian assistance, as well as contributing to the management
of conflicts by participating in peacekeeping missions in the continent
and supporting their international and regional organizations.27 In
accordance with this new pro-Africa foreign policy orientation, the
number of Turkey’s embassies in Africa has more than tripled, rising
from 12 in 2009 to 39 in 2016,while the number of African embassies
in Turkey has increased from 10 in 2011 to 32 in 2016. Along with the
Turkish government’s increasing diplomatic visibility in Africa, its trade
ratio with African countries is also increasing, though not as much as
those of other emerging powers. However, as elaborated in the following
section, exports to Africa exceed imports. The Turkish government is
also an active contributor to seven out of nine UN missions in Africa
(Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Central African Republic, Darfur,
South Sudan, Ivory Coast and Liberia).The determination to improve
relations with Africa is also seen from the increasing number of
scholarships provided to African students and the expansion of Turkish
Airlines’ routes to 48 African destinations.28
In the mood of Turkey’s celebration of 2005 as “The Year of Africa”,
Recep Tayyip ErdoGan travelled south of the Equator that same year,
thus becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit the
continent.29Also,  in 2011, Erdogan became the first non-African leader
27 <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>
28 <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>
29 The destination countries were Ethiopia and South Africa.
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to visit Somalia in two decades.30 Following the visit, which was
intended to draw attention to the famine in the country, Turkey scaled
up its aid programme in the country and organized the second Istanbul
Somalia Conference in 2012. The visit was symbolically significant
and emphasized Turkey’s growing interest in Africa as an important
part of AKP’s multidimensional foreign policy.31 As Tank noted, “the
growing engagement with Africa is indicative of a new humanitarian
approach expressly linked to [Turkey’s] globalizing foreign policy and
a stronger proactive role, which includes trade and peacebuilding
initiatives as a part of an all-encompassing humanitarian and
development agenda”.32 For example, Turkish businesses, which see
Somalia as an emerging market for Turkey, have helped develop
Somalia’s infrastructure  and funded the aid activities of Turkish NGOs.33
Turkey sees its Somalia policy as a “litmus test” for its relations
with Africa as a whole. It is believed that the success or failure of
Turkey’s Somalia policy will determine the perception of other African
countries towards Turkey. Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has also
played an important role in placing the country’s issues on the global
agenda.34 In February 2016, for example, Turkey hosted the third
Somalia High Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) with the participation
of representatives from more than 50 countries and 11 international
organizations.35 Turkey also mediated between the conflicting parties
and launched mediation talks as part of its peace-building efforts. The
first (indirect) talks took place between the Transitional Federal
30 Shinn, 2015: 9.
31 P. Tank, “Turkey’s New Humanitarian Approach in Somalia” (2013) NOREF
Policy Brief 1.
32 Ibid.
33 AkpInar, 2013: 743.
34 M. Özkan, Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a State-Building in
Progress (SETA Publications, 2014) 9-11; Özkan, Mehmet. (2010). Turkey’s
Rising Role in Africa. Turkish Policy Quarterly 9(4): 93-105; Özkan, Mehmet.
(2010). What Drives Turkey’s Involvement in Africa? Review of African Political
Economy. 37(126): 533-540; Özkan, Mehmet (2012). “A New Actor or Passer-
By: The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement with Africa”. Journal of
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 14(1): 113-133; Özkan, Mehmet (2014). “A
Post-2014 Vision for Turkey-Africa Relations”. Insight Turkey,16(4): 23-31.
35 For the details of the meeting, see European Union External Action. (29 February
2016). Somalia High Level Partnership Forum <http://eeas.europa.eu/
top_stories/2016/240216_somalia-high-level-partnership-forum_en.htm>
(27.05.2016).
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Government and al-Shabaab. Turkey also hosted the first presidential
meeting between Somalia and Somaliland in Ankara in 2013. The
meeting also aimed at encouraging the flow of international aid and
development to the country.36 Turkey’s involvement in Somalia
increased its visibility and prestige in the continent and, thus, can
further contribute to its relations with other African countries, especially
in the SSA.
The Turkish government was accepted as an observer country of
the African Union (AU) in 2005, before becoming a strategic partner in
2008. 37 In the same year, Turkey also held the Turkey-Africa Cooperation
Summit with the participation of 49 African countries. Twenty-nine of
these countries were represented by their heads of state and
government at the summit.38 The summit produced the Istanbul
Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity
for a Common Future, which involved cooperation in various priority
areas, including trade and investment, agriculture, agribusiness, rural
development, small and medium-scale enterprises, health, peace and
security, infrastructure, energy and transport, culture, tourism and
education.39 The Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was held in
Equatorial Guinea in 2014 under the theme of “A New Model of
Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and
Integration.” The summit declaration adopted another Joint
Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership for 2015-2019 (The
African Union, 2014: 4), which projected institutional cooperation,
cooperation within international organizations, and with regional
economic communities and civil society. The plan also included several
other articles on trade and investment, agriculture, health, peace and
security, conflict resolution, migration, culture, tourism, education,
36 P. Akpinar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian
Diplomacy” (2013) Turkish Studies. 14(4): 735-757.2013: 745, see also Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Historic Somalia Summit in Ankara. Presidents of
Somalia and Somaliland met in Ankara (27 May 2016).
37 A. Özerdem, “How Turkey is emerging as a development partner in Africa”
(2014). The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2013/apr/10/turkey-development-partner-africa>
38 UNCTAD, 2010: 18.
39 See the Istanbul Declaration on Africa – Turkey Partnership: Solidarity and
Partnership for a Common Future <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/
TURKEYAFRIDECAUG08.PDF>
2017 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND AFRICA 15
sports, media, environment, and energy.40  In his opening speech at
the summit, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, said that
the opening process has been completed and Turkey and Africa have
moved to a new stage of “equal partnership.”41 However, the AU’s
webpage noted that “the Africa-Turkey Partnership has enormous
potentials, but its rate and scope of implementation will need to take
off because, as of now, not much progress has been made in
implementing the Istanbul agreement.”42
2.1 The Involvement of Non-State Actors and
Humanitarian Assistance
Turkey’s aspiration to become a more active player in world politics
has also resulted in its adopting a humanitarian diplomacy. To this
end, it has increased its humanitarian involvement in different regions,
including Africa, both through government agencies and civil society
organizations. For example, in 2013, Turkey distributed US$1.6 billion
in humanitarian aid, making it the third largest donor after the USA
and UK.43 Similarly, in 2014, Turkey provided US$383 million in
development aid to sub-Saharan African countries. This amounted to
one-third of Turkey’s overall development assistance for that year.44 As
Turkey’s major aid agency, TIKA also increased its aid activities in Africa.
The organization was established in 1992 with the sole purpose of
coordinating operations in Central Asia and Caucasia. However, after
2005, TIKA expanded its scope to different regions, including
40 See Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership for 2015-2019
<http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/turkey-africa-joint-implementation-plan-2015-
2019.pdf>
41 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 November 2014, Speech by H.E. Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, the President of the Republic of Turkey. <http://
afrika.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-2014-speech-by-HE-recep-tayyip-erdogan-the-
president-of-the-republic-of-turkey.en.mfa> (10.11.2015).
42 African Union. Africa-Turkey Partnership. <http://www.au.int/en/
partnerships/africa_turkey> (30.09.2014). The document does not have a
publication date. However, the author accessed it before the second Turkey-
Africa summit.
43 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. 2014. <http://www.global
humanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-
2014-interactive.pdf> (08.04.2016).
44 M. Çavuþoglu (2014). 2015 Yilina Girerken Dis Politikamiz. T.C. Disisleri
Bakanligi, M Çavusoglu (2016). 2016 Yili Basinda Dis Politikamiz. T.C. Disisleri
Bakanligi.
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45 TIKA. (2005). Faaliyet Raporu 2005. <http://www.TIKA.gov.tr/upload/
oldpublication/ faaliyet-raporu-2005.pdf> (08.04.2016); TIKA. (2013a).
Annual Report 2013. <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/
TIKA%20ANNUAL% 20REPORT%202013.pdf>  (8 April 2016); TIKA.
(2013b). Turkish Development Assistance 2012. <http://www.tika.gov.tr/
upload/oldpublication/TurkishDevelopmentAssistance2012.pdf> (23
April2016); TIKA. (2013c). Turkish Development Assistance 2013. <http://
www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/KYR_FRAE_2013_uyg9.pdf>
(24.05.2016); TIKA. (2015a). Africa. <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2015/
Prestij/Afrika_Ing.pdf> (20 May 2016); TIKA. (2015b). TIKA Afrika’nin 28
Ülkesinde Faaliyet Gösteriyor. <http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/
tika_afrika_nin_28_ulkesinde_faaliyet_ gosteriyor_(video_haber)-15825>
(21.05.2016); TIKA. Fields of Activity. http://www.TIKA.gov.tr/en/fields-of-
activity/2 (1 October2014).
46 TIKA, 2005: v-vi, 151; TIKA, 2013a: 18-19, ibid. TIKA has not published an
annual report since 2013.
47 TIKA, 2015b, supra note 45.
48 TIKA, 2013c: 90, supra note 45.
49 TIKA, 2015b, supra note 45.
programme coordination offices in two African countries (Ethiopia and
Sudan). Currently, 11 of the 40 programme offices are located in the
following African countries: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Senegal, Niger, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Cameroon, and Namibia.45 In line with
government policy to improve relations with African countries, TIKA
now places particular importance on Africa by developing programmes
primarily in education, health and agriculture. Whereas only 28 of the
562 TIKA projects were devoted to Africa in 2005, since Asia was the
priority area, the number rose to 525 or 33.7 per cent of its 1,800
projects in 2013.46
TIKA now operates in 28 African countries with Somalia and
Ethiopia being among the major recipients. Between 2011 and 2014,
TIKA distributed US$315 million in development assistance to various
African countries.47 In 2013, Egypt was the second largest recipient of
Turkish official aid after Syria.48 In 2014, TIKA delivered more than
US$26 million in development assistance to Africa. Somalia received
US$4.5 million while Ethiopia received US$1 million. Kenya, Libya,
Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Tunisia were the other major recipients.49
TIKA develops its projects mostly in coordination with other public
agencies, NGOs and international organizations, including the Islamic
Development Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The Ministry of Health and the
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality are among the public institutions
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50 In July 2015, the Turkish government also pledged to donate $1 million to the
African Union in its fight against the Ebola outbreak (Al Jazeera, 9 July, 2015).
51 TIKA, 2013b: 77; 2013c: 76, supra note 45.
52 TIKA, 2013c: 76-77, supra note 45.
53 Saferworld, 2013, 9.
54 Saferworld, 2015, 9.
55 H. Mohamud, “Turkey’s Role in Somalia: A Model of Solidarity in Tough Times”
Daily Sabah <http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/01/24/turkeys-role-
in-somalia-a-model-of-solidarity-in-tough-times> (09 April 2016).
delivering medical relief to African countries.50 AFAD also provides
humanitarian assistance, especially for disaster and emergency relief.
As already discussed, Turkish aid is delivered not only through the
Turkish government but also through civil society groups operating on
the ground. In 2011, 60 per cent of all NGO assistance was distributed
for alleviating famine in Somalia. In 2012, Africa was still the leading
regional recipient of Turkish NGO assistance with US$68.54 million,
followed by the Middle East with US$42.07 million, and South and
Central Asia with US$27.54 million.51 However, following recent
developments in Syria, the Middle East replaced Africa as the major
recipient of NGO assistance in 2013 whe US$113.38 million was
distributed to the Middle East, and Syria received 40 per cent of all
NGO assistance. Aid to Africa also increased to US$93.22 million, with
Somalia, Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Egypt being the major
recipients in 2013.52
Turkish NGOs often coordinate with local partners. This was very
visible in Somalia, where Turkish NGOs also employed Somali staff,
while Turkish officials worked with government ministries, local
authorities and Somali NGOs.53 This contrasts with other donor
countries that deliver their aid through Nairobi-based international
organizations. Turkey’s aid activities in Somalia illustrate the strong
coordination between the Turkish state and civil society organizations.54
In 2015, the Somalian President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, noted that,
“from the outset, Turkey has treated Somalia as an equal partner,
respected our requests and insisted on our input ... Where other
international partners chose to plan their interventions from elsewhere,
Turkey put its people on the ground in Somalia to maximize the efficient
use of their human and planning resources in support of their financial
resources”.55 For example, Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) established
a Somalia Delegation Presidency after the United Nations (UN) declared
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56 See the webpage of Cansuyu Foundation <http://cansuyu.org.tr/> and the
webpage of IHH <http://www.ihh.org.tr/>
58 See the webpage of Deniz Feneri Association <http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr>
59 See the webpage of Doctors Worldwide <https://www.yyd.org.tr/>
a famine in two areas in Somalia in 2011 and started a relief campaign
in the same year.
Several NGOs and charity agencies, including Cansuyu Charity and
Solidarity Foundation, IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), Doctors
Worldwide and Deniz Feneri Association also operate in various African
countries, investing mostly in education and health. Cansuyu
Foundation and IHH mainly deliver assistance to those suffering from
conflicts, wars, crises and natural disasters. In addition to emergency
aid activities, including search and rescue operations, urgent housing
and medication aid, IHH also has food aid, vocational training, orphan
care and sanitary aid programmes.56 Deniz Feneri is one of the largest
Turkish NGOs, delivering humanitarian assistance in 18 African
countries, including the renovation of a hospital in Niger, reopening an
unused hospital in Somalia, drilling water wells in many African
countries, providing food aid and assistance in education and health,
and organizing other activities during religious holidays.57 Doctors
Worldwide operate in 30 different countries, including10 from Africa.
The organization provides humanitarian and medical aid to Sudan,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Kenya, Niger,
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, and Somalia.58 As previously noted,
business circles also have a strong interest in Turkey’s integration into
world markets. The next  section shows that the activities of those
business groups have also encouraged Turkey to expand its involvement
in Africa and increase its commercial relations with African countries.
The next section of this study discusses Turkey’s economic engagement
in Africa in more detail along with Turkish initiatives in Africa’s energy
industry.
3.  TURKEY-AFRICA ECONOMIC AND
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
In a 2012 interview, Davutoglu claimed that economic interests are
influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy. According to him,
“Increasing the level of economic cooperation with as many countries
as possible has become an important priority of Turkey. It compels us
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to reach out and enhance the scope of our relations on a global scale.”59
The view that there are wide areas of potential cooperation between
Turkey and Africa, such as technology transfer, trade relations and
investment opportunities that further require the development of
commercial relations, is gaining appeal among senior government
officials.60 As Ihsan Dagi notes, “To understand Turkey’s vigorous
regional and global policy one needs to look at the dynamism of the
business sector”. Turkish companies have acted successfully to exploit
the opportunities created by this new diplomatic activism.61 Having
discovered Africa, Turkish business groups, especially small-and medium-
size enterprises, have started to search for more business opportunities
in the continent.62 Many Turkish companies have also started to invest
in Africa. In 2007, the direct investments of 350 Turkish companies
around the continent totalled around US$400 million.63  By 2013, this
reached US$5 billion and climbed higher toUS$6.2 billion in 2016.64
In 2003, for example, only one Turkish company was doing business
in Ethiopia, but by 2014 the number had increased to more than 300.65
In their search for alternative export markets, Turkish exporters
now consider that Africa has great potential for meeting their economic
interests. Turkish firms are particularly active in construction and
60 S. Umar, “The Economic Relations between Turkey and African Countries” IVth
Workshop Final Report: Economic Relations between African Countries and Turkey
(Istanbul: TASAM Strategic Report No: 24: (2007) 22-24.
61 A. Vicky, “Turkey Moves into Africa” (2011) Le Monde Diplomatique. <http://
mondediplo.com/2011/05/08turkey>
62 Hürriyet (29.01.2007). Erdogan: Asirilar dünyayi krize sürüklüyor. <http://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5856841_p.asp> (30.10.2014); Hürriyet.
(27.01.2009). Africa as a savior for Turkish firms. <http://www.hurriyet.
com.tr/english/finance/10861936.asp> (02.01.2015); Hürriyet Daily News.
(27.02.2009). Ties with Africa help ties with <EU. http://avrupa.hurriyet.
com.tr/haberler/daily-news/278988/ties-with-africa-help-ties-with-eu>
(30.10.2014); Hürriyet Daily News (05.02.2013). Energy dependence to grow
in Turkey. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/energy-dependence-to-grow-
in-turkey.aspx?pageID =238&nid=40585> (22.05.2016); Hürriyet Daily News.




63 Umar, 2007: 24, supra note 60.
64 Dünya, Güney Afrika’dan Türkiye’ye yatirim çagrisi. <http://www.dunya.com/
ekonomi/yatirim/guney-afrikadan-turkiyeye-yatirim-cagrisi-209474h.htm>
(12.04.2016), (DEIK, 2016: 2
65 Çavusoglu, 2014: 108; Çavusoglu, 2016: 110.
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infrastructure, with African countries constituting 19 per cent of Turkish
contractors’ international business volume in 2011 (Armagan, 2011).
A 2015 survey revealed that company directors now see Africa as a
fertile area of development with the potential to bring further
investment opportunities. According to the survey, Africa is the second
most popular market (30 per cent) after the Gulf Region (45 per cent)
(KPMG, 2015). For example, in 2015, Limak Holding began to build a
cement factory worth US$40 million in Mozambique with an expected
annual capacity of 2 million tonnes. One Limak board member, Serdar
Bacaksýz, declared that “the company has been closely monitoring the
African market for a long time and might increase its investment by up
to US$150 million if needed.”66
Such construction and infrastructure firms have participated in
projects, especially in Northern African countries like Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, and Morocco, since the 1970s. They still operate such projects,
especially in the latter three countries. The total value of construction
and infrastructure projects undertaken by 115 Turkish firms up to 2010
is US$20.5 billion in Libya, US$5 billion in Algeria and US$1.4 billion
in Morocco. In 2016, Libya constituted 36.3 per cent of the total
construction business of Turkish companies. Meanwhile, Turkish
construction equipment exports to African countries dramatically
increased from US$8 million in 2000 to US$264 million in 2011,
although more than half of these were in North Africa alone.67 However,
projects have also recently started in the following SSA countries:
66 Limak. Limak Holding begins work on cement factory in Mozambique. <http:/
/www.limak.com.tr/press-room/news-limak/2015-en/limak-holding-begins-
work-on-cement-factory-in-mozambique> (15.04.2016).
67 Armagan, Zeynep. (2011): 4-7, ‘Kuzey Afrika’da Kazandiran Sektör: Insaat
Izmir Ticaret Odasi, Dis Ekonomik Iliþkiler ve Uluslararasi Organizasyonlar
Müdürlügü <http://www.izto.org.tr/portals/0/iztogenel/dokumanlar/
kuzey_afrika_4-17-2012%2010-38-28%20am.pdf>; Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. 21 November 2014, Speech by H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the
President of the Republic of Turkey. <http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-
2014-speech-by-HE-recep-tayyip-erdogan-the-president-of-the-republic-of-
turkey.en.mfa> (10.11.2015); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview
by Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on 12 March
2012. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-
published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa>
(01.01.2015); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey’s Development
Cooperation: General Characteristics and the Least Developed Countries (LDC)
Aspect. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa>
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Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, and
Tanzania. Turkey’s share of the construction sector in Africa has doubled
within eight years, from 2 per cent in 2004 to 4.1 per cent in2012.68
From 1990 to 2016, 200 projects were implemented in SSA countries
worth US$8.8 billion69 In 2011, the Turkish government also signed
free trade agreements with three Northern African countries (Tunisia,
Egypt, and Morocco) and one SSA country (Mauritius) (United Nations,
n.d: 79). It also established 23 joint economic commissions and 17
business councils and signed eight double taxation prevention
agreements with African countries (Akel, 2014: 9).
As a United Nations document reveals, Turkey is now one of seven
key emerging economies active in Africa, along with Brazil, China, India,
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation (United
Nations, 2010). Between 2000 and 2010, these countries were involved
in 239 infrastructure projects in Africa, of which 141 (59 per cent)
were linked to Chinese stakeholders followed by Brazil (15.9 per cent),
Korea (8.8 per cent), India (6.3 per cent), Turkey (5.9 per cent),
Malaysia and Russia (2.1 per cent)(United Nations, n.d: 12). Turkey’s
determination to increase its engagement in Africa can be seen from
the fact that it was one of Africa’s top 20 trading partners in 2008 and
top five investment partners in 2011.70
With business councils throughout Northern Africa and in 25 SSA
countries, DEIK has also increased its activities in the region. Various
summits and meetings were held in Turkey with the participation of
several African countries. Speaking at the Symposium of African Day
held by DEIK in May 2015, Ömer Cihad Vardan, President of DEIK,
said that Turkey’s economic, commercial, social and cultural relationship
with African countries is mutually beneficial. Vardan also noted that
Turkish private sector supports the expansion towards Africa through
economic bases and not through military bases as some other countries
do.71 MUSIAD, having offices in five African countries – Ivory Coast,
(02.12.2014); Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey-Africa Relations.
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa> (30.09.2014);
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey’s Energy Profile and Strategy. <http:/
/www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa> (22.05.2016).
68 Türkiye Müteahhitler Birligi <http://www.tmb.org.tr/>
69 Ibid.
70 UNCTAD, 2010: 13, 31-32) (United Nations, n.d.: 82).
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72 See MUSIAD. 2014. Çerçeve. Year 21. No. 63, 54. See also <http://www.musiad.
org.tr/tr-tr/subeler>
73 The most important import categories from Africa are mineral fuels, lubricants
and related materials, pearls and precious stones, inorganic chemicals, cocoa,
and iron and steel (Turkish Ministry of Economy. Africa Regional Information.
<http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions>
(01.01.2015)). However, as the following tables better indicate, the EU is
Turkey’s major import and export partner followed by Asian and other European
countries. Turkey’s imports to the EU are dominated by machinery and transport
material, chemical products and manufactured goods (European Commission.
Countries and Regions: Turkey. <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/turkey/> 23.05.2016)). On the other hand, Turkey’s
major import category from the Middle East is raw materials. It is estimated
that approximately 65 percent of Turkey’s imports from the region are
concentrated on mineral fuels and oils (Turkish Ministry of Economy. Countries
& Regions: Middle East. <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=
countries and regions> (23.05.2016)).
South Africa, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal – also pioneered the
establishment of business associations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
Egypt, Mauritania, South Africa, Niger, Sudan and Uganda.72 The
activities of different business associations have all aimed at
strengthening comprehensive economic cooperation. The following sub-
section considers whether these initiatives, together with government
efforts, have translated into a significant increase in the trade ratio
between Turkey and African countries by presenting recent data on
bilateral and multilateral trade.
3.1 Turkish-African Trade in Numbers
The last decade saw a dramatic increase in Turkish-African relations, as
reflected in trade volume growth between Turkey and African countries.
Graph 1 presents Turkish-African import data between 1997, the year
before the adoption of the Opening to Africa Plan, and 2015. Overall,
Turkish imports from Africa rose after1997, peaking in 2013. There
have been some fluctuations, particularly the fall in 2002and 2009.
Nevertheless, despite the slight decline since 2012, imports remained
atUS$5 billion in 2015.73
Figure 1. Turkish-African Import Data: 1997-2015 (000 US$)
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74 The most important export categories to Africa are iron and steel, mineral fuels
lubricants and related materials, nuclear reactors, machinery and vehicles
(Turkish Ministry of Economy. Africa Regional Information. <http://
www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions> (01.01.2015)).
Turkey’s exports to the EU are mostly machinery and transport equipment and
manufactured goods (European Commission. Countries and Regions: Turkey.
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey>
(23.05.2016)). Turkey’s main export items to the Middle East are pearls, stones
and precious metals, iron and steel, electric machinery and equipment, vehicles,
machinery and mechanical appliances, and mineral fuels and oils (Turkish
Ministry of Economy. Countries & Regions: Middle East. <http://
www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa =countriesandregions> (23.05.2016).
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Customs and Commerce Ministry <http:/
/www.gtb.gov.tr/>
Figure 2 shows that Turkish exports to Africa have risen steadily
overall since 2001, except for a brief dip first in 2010,then in 2011 and
2015, from slightly over US$1 billion in 1997 to US$3.5 billion in
2005 and US$12.5 billion in 2015. Exports mostly went to North Africa,
with nearly less than one-half going to the sub-Saharan countries.74
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Figure 2. Turkish-African Export Data: 1997-2015 (000 US$)
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Customs and Commerce Ministry <http:/
/www.gtb.gov.tr/>
As shown in Table 1, Turkey’s exports to Africa are concentrated on
a few major trade partners, with Turkey’s five major export partners in
2015 all being from Northern Africa. After these come various SSA
countries: South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Ghana. The trade
volume with these 10 countries constitutes nearly 85 per cent of
Turkey’s total African export volume.
Table 1: Top Five Export Partners in Africa, 2015 (000 US$)
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Customs and Commerce Ministry <http:/
/www.gtb.gov.tr/>
North-Africa 
Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt 
1,337,801 1,826,181 819,091 1,420,240 3,125,089 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa Nigeria Ethiopia Sudan Ghana 
489,168 313,922 383,596 424,556 219,729 
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Table 2 shows Turkey’s major import partners in 2015 as Egypt,
South Africa, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory
Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Of these, imports from
the three North African countries (Egypt, Morocco and Algeria) account
for nearly half of Turkey’s total imports from Africa. Together with the
export data, this table indicates that Turkey’s closest business partners
are still located in North Africa despite all the official rhetoric
emphasizing Turkey’s determination to improve trade relations with
SSA countries and all of the initiatives to diversify Turkey’s trade partners
in Africa. A detailed analysis also indicates that Turkey’s major trade
partners in SSA have remained the same following the opening to Africa.
Table 2. Top Five Import Partners in Africa, 2015 (000 US$)
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Customs and Commerce Ministry <http:/
/www.gtb.gov.tr/>
While economic and trade relations with African countries have
continued to grow, they have not yet reached the desired phase or
level. Table 3, which presents recent data for Turkey’s imports by country
groups, demonstrates that Africa still only has a marginal share, at 2.5
per cent, of Turkey’s total imports, especially when compared to Turkey’s
traditional trade partners like European, Asian and Middle Eastern
countries.
As Table 4 makes clear, the same applies to Turkey’s exports by
country groups. Although Turkey exports more to Africa than it imports,
export levels, at 8.6 per cent, still lag far behind exports to EU countries
or the Near and Middle East. Exports to SSA account for less than half
of exports to North Africa.
North-Africa 
Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt 
710,622 740,547 144,077 195,796 1,215,905 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa Nigeria Congo Dem. 
Rep. 
Ivory Coast Ghana 
918,541 189,985 130,523 274,350 168,907 
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Table 3. Turkey’s Imports by Country Groups, 2015(000 US$)
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Statistical Institute <http://
www.turkstat.gov.tr/>
Table 4. Turkey’s Exports by Country Groups, 2015 (000 US$)
Source: Data abstracted from Turkish Statistical Institute <http://
www.turkstat.gov.tr/>
The majority of Turkey’s imports and exports are still concentrated
on its traditional trade partners, although Turkey’s overall trade volume
with African countries increased by nearly 500 per cent, from US$3.4
billion in 1997 to US$17.5 billion in 2015. However, this trade is still
dominated by Northern African countries, and this is unlikely to change,
at least in the near future. Despite the efforts at trade diversification,
Country Groups Imports % share 
EU Countries 78,668,832 38.0 
Other European Countries 28,109,858 13.6 
North Africa 3,006,952 1.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,092,386 1.0 
North America 12,057,020 5.8 
Central America and the Caribbean 1,039,500 0.5 
South America 3,661,121 1.8 
Near and Middle East 13,574,618 6.6 
Other Asia 53,339,679 25.7 
Australia and New Zealand 608,577 0.3 
Other Regions and Countries 9,821,057 4.7 
Total 207,206,813 100 
 
Country Groups Exports  % share 
EU Countries 64,008,890 44.5 
Other European Countries 14,143,878 9.8 
North Africa 8,528,402 5.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3,922,011 2.7 
North America 7,066,716 4.9 
Central America and the Caribbean 848,855 0.6 
South America 1,309,912 0.9 
Near and Middle East 31,092,055 21.6 
Other Asia 10,308,562 7.2 
Australia and New Zealand 619,543 0.4 
Other Regions and Countries 105,899 0.1 
Total 143,861,522 100 
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the recent increase in commercial relations and Africa’s great investment
potential for Turkish businesses, Turkish-African trade remains low. At
the same time, some Turkish firms are cautious about investing in the
African market as it is a new area, especially for small and medium-
sized businesses with concerns over unknown risks.75 As Kaplan puts
it, “gaining a financial foothold in Africa would be a challenge,
especially as Turkey has been gripped by its own domestic turmoil in
recent months. The fact that India and China have already entered
the African market, offering more competitive prices, was likely to
make it difficult for Turkey to profit in the region”76 It is therefore
necessary to take more concrete steps to further increase cooperation
at various levels, including energy. The following sub-section focuses
on Turkey’s recent interest in Africa’s energy industry and major
initiatives taken by Turkish companies.
3.2 Turkey’s Interest in Africa’s Energy Sector
Official sources emphasize an increasing engagement with African
countries in the energy sector. Thus, Turkey’s investment in African
energy is based on mutual interests, unlike Africa’s past trade partners.
For example, at the 16th Africa Energy Forum held in Istanbul in June
2014, Taner Yildiz, former Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural
Resources, emphasized Turkey’s determination to invest in Africa’s
energy industry in a way to help African countries benefit from the
natural resources extracted from their own territories.77  Turkey’s recent
interest towards Africa’s energy industry is largely related to the
country’s dependence on energy imports and the urgent need to diversify
its source countries. Turkey is one of those countries highly dependent
on outside sources to meet its rapidly increasing energy demand, which
raises concerns over its energy security.
75 E.Kaplangil, 2 milyon dolari olmayan Afrika’ya gitmesin (2016) Hürriyet. <http:/
/www.hurriyet.com.tr/2-milyon-dolari-olmayan-afrikaya-gitmesin-23353844>
76 M. Kaplan, “Turkey-Africa Economic Relations: After Russian Sanctions, Turkish
Businesses Eye African Markets to Offser Losses” (2015) International Business
Times. <http://www.ibtimes.com/turkey-africa-economic-relations-after-
russian-sanctions-turkish-businesses-eye-2228482>
77 Daily Sabah (18.08.2014). “Turkey Plans to Invest in Africa’s Energy Industry”.
<http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/08/18/turkey-plans-to-invest-in-
africas-energy-industry> (01.10.2014); Daily Sabah. (21.08.2014). Turkey’s
TPAO to seek oil in Angola. <http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/08/
21/turkeys-tpao-to-seek-oil-in-angola>
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Turkey is now second, after China, in terms of energy demand
growth. Domestic sources only meet one third of the total energy
demand while the rest is provided from different foreign energy
suppliers. In order to reduce its energy dependence, there have been
efforts to increase energy efficiency and the share of renewable energy
sources, maximizing the use of domestic sources, and building nuclear
power plants. As part of its energy strategy, Turkey also aims at becoming
a regional energy hub along the East-West and North-South Energy
Corridors.78 The latest data reveals that nearly 99 per cent of Turkey’s
natural gas is imported via several energy supply routes. Specifically,
Turkey imports 58 per cent of its natural gas from Russia, followed by
Iran (18 per cent), Azerbaijan (12 per cent), Algeria (7.7 per cent) and
Nigeria (2.4 per cent). Turkey also imports 89 per cent of its oil supplies.
In 2015, nearly half of its crude oil imports came from Iraq (45.6 per
cent). Other major suppliers were Iran (22.4 per cent), Russia (12.4
per cent), Saudi Arabia (9.6 per cent), Colombia (3.5 per cent),
Kazakhstan (2.6 per cent) and Nigeria (2.1 per cent).79 According to
2013 data, Turkey ranks fifth in natural gas imports, eighth in hard
coal imports and 13th in oil imports.80 Turkey’s limited domestic
reserves coupled with its growing energy demand have resulted in its
foreign energy dependence.81 Furthermore, its energy demand is
expected to double over the next decade.82 However, while Turkey is
trying to diversify its energy partners, Nigeria is its sole African partner
for natural gas and oil imports. Unlike BRICS countries, especially China
and Brazil, with large investments in African energy, Turkey’s interest
in Africa’s traditional energy resources is also limited to a few initiatives.
These include the signing of energy cooperation agreements with
Djibouti, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, Kenya and the Gambia, and
agreements to construct power stations in a few African countries,
such as Ghana and Rwanda, which were unsuccessful due to feasibility
problems.83 In 2014, officials from the Turkish Energy and Natural
78 See Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey’s Energy Profile and Strategy.
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa> (22.05.2016).
79 <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa>
80 TMMOB (Makine Mühendisleri Odasi) (2015). Bülten: Ocak 2015 Itibariyla
Türkiye’nin Enerji Görünümü Raporu. Sayi 200.
81 <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa>
82 (Hürriyet Daily News, 05.02.2013).
83 Daily Sabah. (18.08.2014). Turkey Plans to Invest in Africa’s Energy Industry.
<http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/08/18/turkey-plans-to-invest-in-
africas-energy-industry> (01.10.2014).
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Resources stated that Angola was one of the countries with priority for
the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), which is looking to invest
in oil extraction. Since many other companies are also operating in
deep-water searches, TPAO plans to explore on land.84 Many Turkish
companies have also started to export their gas-turbine power plants
to mainly African countries that need to increase their energy supply.
As Sarempet Enerji General, Ali Riza Öner stated, “most African regions
have an energy deficit, and their purchasing guarantees constitute the
lifeblood of the second-hand power plant market”.85 Experts argue that
Turkey should invest more in African energy resources because of its
proximity to the region. For example, Shinn noted in 2014 that he was
surprised Turkey had not already invested in Africa’s energy industry
although energy infrastructure is a lucrative sector for Turkish investors.86
At the Africa Energy Forum in Istanbul, Edward Njoroge, Chairman
of the Nairobi Securities Exchange, reportedly said Turkey should show
more interest in investing in African countries, especially in power
generation and power distribution. According to him, “There are
opportunities in the continent. The demand is still very, very high, the
suppliers are patient. Therefore, we are looking for any countries like
Turkey to invest in Africa” 87 However, the forum was far from producing
tangible economic outcomes for Turkish businesses. In late 2015,
Sureyya Yucel, chairman of the Energy Business council of DEIK,also
said that Turkish businessmen should go to Africa to meet Africa’s
energy demand.88  Yet, there are only a few Turkish companies investing
in African energy, such as Hakan Mining and Electricity Generation
Industry, Karadeniz Energy Group and Aksa Energy.
In 2011, Hakan Mining reached an agreement with the Rwandan
government to build a 100MW peat-fired power plant to raise the
84 Daily Sabah, 21.08.2014.
85 Erdil, 08.10.2015
86 S. Tonkus, “Experts Predict Turkish Energy Investment in Africa” Anadolu Agency.
<http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/exclusive-experts-predict-turkish-energy-
investment-in-africa/149427> (05.04.2016); Turkish Weekly, “Africa Courts
Energy Investment from Turkey” <http://www.turkishweekly.net/2014/06/
28/news/africa-courts-energy-investment-from-turkey/> (05.04.2016).
87 Turkish Weekly, 28.06.2014.
88 Anadolu Agency, (30.12.2015). Africa: New Destination for Turkish energy
investors. <https://energy.aa.com.tr/newsRegion.php?newsid=7177988>
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country’s generating capacity by 90 percent.89 This project, however,
failed to deliver on time, reportedly because of poor feasibility studies.
In 2016, the Rwandan government, through the Ministry of
Infrastructure, signed another deal with the company to install an
80MW peat power plant. This time, the Minister of Infrastructure noted
that if the new project was not delivered effectively on time, the
company would be penalized.90 In 2014, Karadeniz Energy Group,
through its subsidiary, Karpowership Ghana Company Limited, signed
a ten-year powerpurchase agreement with the state-run Electricity
Company of Ghana for the construction of two floating power stations
to generate 450MW of electricity to Ghana every year.91 In 2015, a
Ghanaian opposition member filed a legal suit against the deal in
Ghana’s Supreme Court, alleging that the deal breached the
constitution.92 Aksa Energy is among those few Turkish energy
companies exploring new African markets. In 2015, Aksa Energy signed
a five-year power purchase agreement with the Ghanaian government
to build a 370MW power plant that is expected to operate from the
second half of 2016.93 In looking for investment opportunities abroad
and developing energy projects in Africa, Aksa Energy has plans to
further expand into 10 African countries.94 As earlier indicated, Turkey’s
interest in Africa’s energy sector is new and limited to a few initiatives
with Turkish companies experiencing efficiency problems. These
attempts cannot be compared with the interest of other great powers
investing in Africa’s energy sector.
Nevertheless, Turkey is now more determined in investing in Africa’s
energy industry as manifested in the detailed articles about energy
cooperation of the Joint Implementation Plan signed after the second
Turkey-Africa summit. In contrast with the Istanbul Declaration signed
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91 Ergin, 17.06.2014).
92 World Bulletin. (20.06.2015), “Ghana-Turkey Power Deal in Legal Limbo” http:/
/www.worldbulletin.net/news/160961/Ghana (07.04.2016).
93 Hürriyet Daily News, 15.08.2015.
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after the first Turkey-Africa summit, which only acknowledged the
importance of energy cooperation between the two parties without
any detail on its implementation, the Joint Implementation Plan
projected stronger cooperation in the energy field. The parties agreed
to:
cooperate in enhancing energy infrastructure in Africa with a view
to further develop the energy industry in Africa; promote the
cooperation between Turkish energy companies and national
petroleum and natural gas companies in African countries with a
view to exploring opportunities of oil, oil products and natural
gas trading for the benefit of both sides; improve institutional and
technical capacities of African countries... and also cooperate in
the field of effective management of mining resources; cooperate
in the fields of engineering and pre-construction and construction
of oil and natural gas pipelines; cooperate in every segment of the
electrical sector; cooperate in the field of mining and mineral
processing technologies, to accelerate the industrialization of
Africa, to the mutual benefit of both parties.95
So far, however, not much progress has been made to implement
the plan while the strategic partnership announced at the summit has
not been translated into large-scale projects or natural resource related
concessions. As Tepebas notes, “competition in Africa’s energy sector
is ‘very fierce’... and the government should increase incentives to do
business in Africa”.96 However, Turkey’s capacity to compete with other
traditional and emerging powers investing in Africa’s energy sector is
limited. Experts note that due to its geographical position, Turkey has
important renewable energy potential. The government passed a
Renewable Energy Law in 2005 to increase the use of these resources,
especially for electricity. Nevertheless, as these resources are still
inefficiently used and Turkey’s energy production is far less than its
energy consumption, the reliance on imported sources continues.97
95 See Article 12 of the Plan on Infrastructure, Energy, Mining and Transport
<http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/turkey-africa-joint-implementation-plan-2015-
2019.pdf>
96 Turkish Weekly, 28.06.2014.
97 Arioglu Akan, Mahmure Övül, Ayse Ayçim Selam, Seniye Ümit Oktay Firat,
Merve Er Kara and Semih Özel, “A Comparative Analysis of Renewable Energy
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This makes cooperation with African countries in the energy sector
even more urgent. On the other hand, it also raises questions about
Turkey’s potential to contribute to the management of Africa’s resources
or improve the capacities of African countries in this field.
4. CONCLUSION
After many years that African affairs had occupied a secondary status
in Turkish foreign policy, the late 1990s saw a different foreign policy
initiative. This aimed at expanding foreign policy options, with African
countries now viewed as offering Turkey new prospects for foreign policy
diversification and an opportunity to enter new markets. Within the
scope of the Opening Up to Africa, the Turkish government sought to
correct past failures and pursue a more dynamic and multi-faceted
foreign policy towards Africa. The years following the adoption of this
policy, therefore, saw an increase in Turkey’s engagement in the
continent. As a result of this policy shift, Turkey steadily enhanced its
diplomatic presence in African countries, improved its relations with
regional organizations, adopted several strategies of economic relations
and tried to develop its political relations with African countries on
both bilateral and multilateral platforms. Providing development
assistance in different parts of the world, including Africa, has become
one of the most important aspects of Turkish foreign policy under the
AKP government as Turkish officials try to reshape foreign policy to
increase Turkey’s role in regional and world politics. To this end, the
Turkish government also committed itself to increasing assistance flows
to Africa, with the increasing NGO involvement. More Turkish
companies invested in African countries and expanded their activities,
with Turkish business circles now considering Africa as a promising
area for investment. These civic and business circles, with their
increasing humanitarian and trade activities in Africa, have enhanced
Turkey’s presence in the continent.
On the other hand, African reactions to Turkey’s Africa policy have
been “a mixture of mild expectation and confusion”.98 As Özkan notes,
“following China and India, the question of why Turkey has shown
what some consider an unexpected interest in the continent still does
not have a clear answer for African partners”. Although the low level of
98 Özkan, 2010: 103, supra note 34.
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attention paid to African issues has changed, the pace of the
development of relations – especially with SSA countries – is still slow
eighteen years after the opening policy was first implemented. Moreover,
Turkey’s growing diplomatic and humanitarian involvement in the
continent has not been translated into a radical increase in investment
and trade flows. Trade volumes with Africa still fall below anticipated
levels. For example, whereas trade had been predicted to reach US$30
billion soon after 2007 nearly ten years later, it is still below US$20
billion, including both the North and Sub-Saharan Africa, while the
goal of achieving a trade volume of US$100 billion by 2023 also seems
unrealistic.99 Moreover, North Africa continues to dominate the bulk of
trade between Africa and Turkey with Turkish companies being active
mostly in the North African countries. African countries have recently
attracted more attention, especially from Turkish construction
companies with only a few projects in SSA countries. Although Turkey
has an increasing interest towards Africa and it has expanded beyond
North Africa, relations with SSA countries still remains low. As noted,
Turkey’s interest in African energy industry is limited so-far to futile
initiatives of signing cooperation agreements with a few African
countries. Turkey is still an energy importer, and despite recent attempts
to increase its capacity, especially through the increasing use of
renewables, not much progress has been made in this regard.
Recent developments in domestic politics, including the
replacement of Ahmet Davutoglu, with Binali Yildirim as prime minister,
raise the question of continuity in Turkey’s African policy. This author
does not think there will be are treat from the continent or any radical
foreign policy change on Africa. Even though Davutogolu was the major
architect of the Turkish foreign policy over the last decade, the opening
plan to Africa was taken before the AKP government assumed power.
It was the result of various interrelated factors explained before. Rather,
relations with African countries have gained an irreversible momentum,
especially during the last decade, and Turkish businesses, seeing Africa
a fertile area for investment, would continue to pursue their commercial
interests.
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